Private Outsourcing of Polynomial Evaluation and Matrix Multiplication
  using Multilinear Maps by Zhang, Liang Feng & Safavi-Naini, Rehanehi
ar
X
iv
:1
30
8.
42
18
v3
  [
cs
.C
R]
  3
 Se
p 2
01
3
Private Outsourcing of Polynomial Evaluation and Matrix
Multiplication using Multilinear Maps
Liang Feng Zhang and Rehanehi Safavi-Naini
Institute for Security, Privacy and Information Assurance
Department of Computer Science
University of Calgary
{liangf.zhang, rei.safavi}@gmail.com
Abstract
Verifiable computation (VC) allows a computationally weak client to outsource the evaluation
of a function on many inputs to a powerful but untrusted server. The client invests a large amount
of off-line computation and gives an encoding of its function to the server. The server returns both
an evaluation of the function on the client’s input and a proof such that the client can verify the
evaluation using substantially less effort than doing the evaluation on its own. We consider how to
privately outsource computations using privacy preserving VC schemes whose executions reveal no
information on the client’s input or function to the server. We construct VC schemes with input
privacy for univariate polynomial evaluation and matrix multiplication and then extend them such
that the function privacy is also achieved. Our tool is the recently developed mutilinear maps. The
proposed VC schemes can be used in outsourcing private information retrieval (PIR).
1 Introduction
The rise of cloud computing in recent years has made outsourcing of storage and computation a reality
with many cloud service providers offering attractive services. Large computation can hugely impact
resources (e.g. battery) of weak clients. Outsourcing computation removes this bottleneck but also
raises a natural question: how to assure the computation is carried out correctly as the server is
untrusted. This assurance is not only against malicious behaviors but also infrastructure failures of
the server. Verifiable computation (VC) [16] provides such assurances for a large class of computation
delegation scenarios. The client in this model invests a large amount of off-line computation and
generates an encoding of its function f . Given the encoding and any input α, the server computes
and responds with y and a proof that y = f(α). The client can verify if the computation has been
carried out correctly using substantially less effort than computing f(α) on its own. In particular, the
client’s off-line computation cost is amortized over the evaluations of f on multiple inputs α.
VC schemes were formally defined by Gennaro, Gentry and Parno [16] and then constructed for
a variety of computations [11, 3, 25, 2, 23, 13, 12]. We say that a VC scheme is privacy preserving
if its execution reveals no information on the client’s input or function to the server. Protecting the
client’s input and function from the server is an essential requirement in many real-life scenarios. For
example, a health professional querying a database of medical records may need to protect both the
identity and the record of his patient. VC schemes with input privacy have been considered in [16, 2]
where a generic function is written as a circuit, and each gate is evaluated using a fully homomorphic
encryption scheme (FHE). These VC schemes evaluate the outsourced functions as circuits and are
not very efficient. Furthermore, the outsourced functions are given to the server in clear and therefore
the function privacy is not achieved. Benabbas, Gennaro and Vahlis [3] and several other works
[13, 12, 23] design VC schemes for specific functions without using FHE. Some of them even achieve
function privacy. However, they do not consider the input privacy.
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1.1 Results and Techniques
In this paper, we consider privacy preserving VC schemes for specific function evaluations without
using FHE. The function evaluations we study include univariate polynomial evaluation and matrix
multiplication. Our privacy definition is indistinguishability based and guarantees no untrusted server
can distinguish between different inputs or functions of the client. In privacy preserving VC schemes
both the client’s input and function must be hidden (e.g., encrypted) from the server and the server
must evaluate the hidden function on the hidden input and then generate a proof that the evaluation
has been carried out correctly. Note that such a proof can be generated using the non-interactive proof
or argument systems from [22, 4] but they require the use of either random oracles or knowledge of
exponent (KoE) type assumptions, both of which are considered as strong [23] and have been carefully
avoided by the VC literatures [16, 3, 25].
We construct VC schemes for univariate polynomial evaluation and matrix multiplication that
achieve input privacy and then extend them such that the function privacy is also achieved. Our
main tool is the multilinear maps [14, 15]. Very recently, Garg, Gentry, and Halvei [14] proposed
a candidate mechanism that would approximate or be the moral equivalent of multilinear maps for
many applications. In [15], it was believed that the mechanism opens an exciting opportunity to
study new constructions using a multilinear map abstraction. Following [15], we use a framework of
leveled multilinear maps where one can call a group generator G(1λ, k) to obtain a sequence of groups
G1, . . . , Gk of order N along with their generators g1, . . . , gk, where N = pq for two λ-bit primes p and
q. Slightly abusing notation, if i+j ≤ k, we can compute a bilinear map operation on gai ∈ Gi, gbj ∈ Gj
as e(gai , g
b
j) = g
ab
i+j . These maps can be seen as implementing a k-multilinear map. We denote by
Γk = (N,G1, . . . , Gk, e, g1, . . . , gk)← G(1λ, k) (1)
a random k-multilinear map instance, where N = pq for two λ-bit primes p and q. We start with
the BGN encryption scheme (denoted by BGN2) of Boneh, Goh and Nissim [6] which is based on Γ2
and semantically secure when the subgroup decision assumption (abbreviated as SDA, see Definition
2.1) for Γ2 holds. It is well-known that BGN2 is both additively homomorphic and multiplicatively
homomorphic, i.e., given BGN2 ciphertexts Enc(m1) and Enc(m2) one can easily compute Enc(m1 +
m2) and Enc(m1m2). Furthermore, BGN2 supports an unlimited number of additive homomorphic
operations: for any integer k ≥ 2, given BGN2 ciphertexts Enc(m1), . . . ,Enc(mk) one can easily
compute Enc(m1 + · · · + mk). As a result, one can easily compute Enc(f(α)) from Enc(α) for any
quadratic polynomial f(x). On the other hand, BGN2 supports only one multiplicative homomorphic
operation: one cannot compute Enc(m1m2m3) from Enc(m1),Enc(m2) and Enc(m3). In particular,
one cannot compute Enc(f(α)) from Enc(α) for any polynomial f(x) of degree ≥ 3. In Section 2.2, we
introduce BGNk, which is a generalization of BGN2 over Γk and semantically secure under the SDA
for Γk. BGNk supports both an unlimited number of additive homomorphic operations and up to k−1
multiplicative homomorphic operations. As a result, it allows us to compute Enc(f(α)) from Enc(α)
for any degree-k polynomial f(x). In our VC schemes, the client’s input and function are encrypted
using BGNk for a suitable k and the server computes on the ciphertexts.
Polynomial evaluation. In Section 3.1 we propose a VC scheme Πpe with input privacy (see Fig. 2)
that allows the client to outsource the evaluation of a degree n polynomial f(x) on any input α from
a polynomial size domain D. In [20], the algebraic property that there is a polynomial c(x) of degree
n− 1 such that f(x)− f(α) = (x−α)c(x) was applied to construct polynomial commitment schemes.
Those schemes actually give us a basic VC scheme for univariate polynomial evaluation but without
input privacy. Let e : G1 ×G1 → G2 be a bilinear map, where G1 and G2 are cyclic groups of prime
order p and G1 is generated by g1. In the basic VC scheme, the client makes public t = g
f(s)
1 and gives
pk = (g1, g
s
1, . . . , g
sn
1 , f(x)) to the server, where s is uniformly chosen from Zp. To verifiably compute
f(α), the client gives α to the server and the server returns ρ = f(α) along with a proof π = g
c(s)
1 .
Finally the client verifies if e(t/gρ1 , g1) = e(g
s
1/g
α
1 , π). The basic VC scheme is secure under the SBDH
assumption [20]. It has been generalized in [23] to construct VC schemes for multivariate polynomial
2
evaluation.
In Πpe, the α should be hidden from the server (e.g., the client gives Enc(α) to the server) which
makes the server’s computation of ρ and π (as in the basic VC scheme) impossible. Instead, the best
one can expect is to compute a ciphertext ρ = Enc(f(α)) from Enc(α) and f(x). This can be achieved
if the underlying encryption scheme Enc is an FHE which we want to avoid. On the other hand, a
proof π that the computation of ρ has been carried out correctly should be given to the client. To
the best of our knowledge, for generating such a proof π, one may adopt the non-interactive proofs
or arguments of [22, 4] but those constructions require the use of either random oracles or KoE type
assumptions which we want to avoid as well. Our idea is to adopt the multilinear maps [14, 15] which
allow the server to homomorphically compute on Enc(α) and f(x) and then generate ρ = Enc(f(α)).
In Πpe, the client picks a (2k + 1)-multilinear map instance Γ as in (1). It stores t = g
f(s)
1 and gives
~ξ = (g1, g
s
1, g
s2
1 . . . , g
s2
k−1
1 ) and f(x) to the server, where k = log⌈n + 1⌉. It also sets up BGN2k+1.
In order to verifiably compute f(α), the client gives k ciphtertexts σ = (σ1, . . . , σk) to the server and
the server returns ρ = Enc(f(α)) along with a proof π = Enc(c(s)), where σℓ = Enc(α
2ℓ−1) for every
ℓ ∈ [k]. Note that f(α) and c(s) = (f(s)− f(α))/(s−α) are both polynomials in α and s. In Section
2.2, we show how the server can compute ρ and π from f(x), σ and ~ξ. Upon receiving (ρ, π), the
client decrypts ρ to y and verifies if e(t/gy1 , g
p
2k) = e(g
s
1/g
α
1 , π
p). Finally, we can show the security and
privacy of Πpe under the assumptions (2k+1, n)-MSDHS (see Definition 2.2) and SDA (see Definition
2.1).
Matrix multiplication. In Section 3.2 we propose a VC scheme Πmm with input privacy (see Fig.
3) that allows the client to outsource the computation of Mx for any n × n matrix M = (Mij) and
vector x = (x1, . . . , xn). It is based on the algebraic PRFs with closed form efficiency (firstly defined
by [3]). In Section 2.3, we present an algebraic PRF with closed form efficiency PRFdlin = (KG,F)
over a trilinear map instance Γ, where for any secret key K generated by KG, FK is a function with
domain [n]2 and range G1. In Πmm, the client gives both M and its blinded version T = (Tij) to the
server, where Tij = g
p2aMij
1 · FK(i, j) for every (i, j) ∈ [n]2 and a is randomly chosen from ZN and
fixed for any (i, j) ∈ [n]2. It also sets up BGN3. In order to verifiably compute Mx, the client stores
τi =
∏n
j=1 e(FK(i, j), g
pxj
2 ) for every i ∈ [n], where τi can be efficiently computed using the closed
form efficiency property of PRFdlin. It gives the ciphertexts σ = (Enc(x1), . . . ,Enc(xn)) to the server
and the server returns ρi = Enc(
∑n
j=1Mijxj) along with a proof πi =
∏n
j=1 e(Tij ,Enc(xj)) for every
i ∈ [n]. Upon receiving ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn) and π = (π1, . . . , πn), the client can decrypt ρi to yi and verify
if e(πi, g
p
1) = η
pyi · τi for every i ∈ [n], where η = gp
2a
3 . Finally, we can show the security and privacy
of Πmm under the assumptions 3-co-CDHS (see Definition 2.5), DLIN (see Definition 2.5) and SDA.
Applications. Our VC schemes have applications in outsourcing private information retrieval where
the client stores a large database w = w1 · · ·wn ∈ {0, 1}n with the cloud and later retrieves a bit
without revealing which bit he is interested in. Outsourcing PIR has practical significance: for example
a health professional that stores a database of medical records with the cloud may want to privately
retrieve the record of a certain patient. Our VC schemes provide easy solutions for outsourcing PIR.
A client with database w can outsource a polynomial f(x) to the cloud using Πpe, where f(i) = wi
for every i ∈ [n]. The client can also represent its database as a √n × √n matrix M = (Mij) and
outsource it to the cloud using Πmm. Retrieving any bit Mij can be reduced to computing Mx for
a 0-1 vector x ∈ {0, 1}
√
n whose j-th bit is 1 and all other bits are 0. Our indistinguishability based
definition of input privacy (see Fig. 1) guarantees that the server cannot learn which bit the client is
interested in.
Discussions. Note that decrypting ρ = Enc(f(α)) in Πpe requires computing discrete logarithms (see
Section 2.2). Hence, the f(α) should be from a polynomial-size domain M since otherwise the client
will not be able to decrypt ρ and then verify its correctness. In fact, this is an inherent limitation
of [6] and inherited by the generalized BGN encryption schemes. However, in Section 3.3 we shall
see that the limitation is only theoretical and does not affect the application of Πpe in outsourcing
PIR, where f(α) ∈ {0, 1}. One may also argue that with f(x) and the knowledge of “f(α) ∈ M”,
3
the server may learn a polynomial size domain D where α is drawn from and therefore guess α with
non-negligible probability. However, due to Definition 2.9, we stress that the input privacy achieved
by Πpe is indistinguishability based which does not contradict to the above argument. In fact, such a
privacy level suffices for our applications in outsourcing PIR. In Section 3.4, we show how to modify
Πpe such that f(x) is also hidden and therefore prevent the cloud from learning any information about
α. Similar discussions as above are applicable to Πmm.
Extensions. In Section 3.4, we modify Πpe and Πmm such that the function privacy is also achieved.
In the modified schemes Π′pe (see Fig. 4) and Π′mm (see Fig. 5), the outsourced functions are encrypted
and then given to the server. The basic idea is increasing the multi-linearity by 1 such that both the
server and the client can compute on encrypted inputs and functions with one more application of the
multilinear map e. The modified schemes Π′pe and Π
′
mm achieve both input and function privacy.
1.2 Related Work
Verifiable computation can be traced back to the work on interactive proofs or arguments [19, 22]. In
the context of VC, the non-interactive proofs or arguments are much more desirable and have been
considered in [22, 4] for various computations. However, they use either random oracles or KoE type
assumptions.
Gennaro, Gentry and Parno [16] constructed the first non-interactive VC schemes without using
random oracles or KoE type assumptions. Their construction is based on the FHE and garbled circuits.
Also based on FHE, Chung et al. [11] proposed a VC scheme that requires no public key. Applebaum
et al. [1] reduced VC to suitable variants of secure multiparty computation protocols. Barbosa et al.
[2] also obtained VC schemes using delegatable homomorphic encryption. Although the input privacy
has been explicitly considered in [16, 2], those schemes evaluate the outsourced functions as circuits
and are not very efficient. Furthermore, in these schemes the outsourced functions are known to the
server. Hence, they do not achieve function privacy.
Benabbas et al. [3] initiated a line of research on efficient VC schemes for specific function (polyno-
mial) evaluations based on algebraic PRFs with closed form efficiency. In particular, one of their VC
schemes achieves function privacy. Parno et al. [25] initiated a line of research on public VC schemes
for evaluating Boolean formulas, where the correctness of the server’s computation can be verified by
any client. Also based on algebraic PRFs with closed form efficiency, Fiore et al. [13, 12] constructed
public VC schemes for both polynomial evaluation and matrix multiplication. Using the the idea of
polynomial commitments [20], Papamanthou et al. [23] constructed public VC schemes that enable
efficient updates. A common drawback of [3, 25, 13, 12, 23] is that the input privacy is not achieved.
VC schemes with other specific properties have also been constructed in [18, 22, 10, 4, 8, 9]. However,
none of them is privacy preserving.
Organization. In Section 2, we firstly review several cryptographic assumptions related to multilinear
maps; then introduce a generalization of the BGN encryption scheme [6]; we also recall algebraic PRFs
with closed form efficiency and the formal definition of VC. In Section 3, we present our VC schemes
for univariate polynomial evaluation and matrix multiplication. In Section 4, we show applications of
our VC schemes in outsourcing PIR. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
For any finite set A, the notation ω ← A means that ω is uniformly chosen from A. Let λ be a security
parameter. We denote by neg(λ) the class of negligible functions in λ, i.e., for every constant c > 0, it
is less than λ−c as long as λ is large enough. We denote by poly(λ) the class of polynomial functions
in λ.
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2.1 Multilinear Maps and Assumptions
In this section, we review several cryptographic assumptions concerning multilinear maps. Given the
Γk in (1) and x ∈ Gi, the subgroup decision problem in Gi is deciding whether x is of order p or not,
where i ∈ [k]. When k = 2, Boneh et al. [6] suggested the Subgroup Decision Assumption (SDA)
which says that the subgroup decision problems in G1 and G2 are intractable. In this paper, we make
the same assumption but for a general integer k ≥ 2.
Definition 2.1 (SDA) We say that SDAi holds if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) al-
gorithm A, |Pr[A(Γk, u) = 1] − Pr[A(Γk, uq) = 1]| < neg(λ), where the probabilities are taken over
Γk ← G(1λ, k), u← Gi and A’s random coins. We say that SDA holds if SDAi holds for every i ∈ [k].
The following lemma shows that SDA is equivalent to SDA1 (see Appendix A for the proof).
Lemma 2.1 If SDAi holds, then SDAj holds for every j = i+ 1, . . . , k.
The k-Multilinear n-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption ((k, n)-MSDH) was suggested in [24]: Given
gs1, g
s2
1 , . . . , g
sn
1 for some s ← ZN , it is difficult for any PPT algorithm to find α ∈ ZN \ {−s} and
output g
1/(s+α)
k .
Definition 2.2 ((k, n)-MSDH) For any PPT algorithm A, Pr [A(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1, . . . , gsn1 ) = (α, g
1
s+α
k )
]
< neg(λ), where α ∈ ZN \ {−s} and the probability is taken over Γk ← G(1λ, k), s ← ZN and A’s
random coins.
We are able to construct a privacy preserving VC scheme (see Section 3.1) for univariate polynomial
evaluation which is secure based on (k, n)-MSDH. Under the (k, n)-MSDH assumption, the following
lemma (see Appendix B for the proof) shows that either one of the following two problems is difficult for
any PPT algorithm: (i) given g1, g
s
1, . . . , g
sn
1 for some s← ZN , compute gp/sk ; (ii) given g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1
for some s← ZN , compute gq/sk .
Lemma 2.2 If (k, n)-MSDH holds, then except for a negligible fraction of the k-multilinear map
instances Γk ← G(1λ, k), either Pr[A(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
p/s
k ] < neg(λ) for any PPT algorithm
A or Pr[A(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
q/s
k ] < neg(λ) for any PPT algorithm A, where the probabilities
are taken over s← ZN and A’s random coins.
Due to Lemma 2.2, it looks reasonable to assume that (i) (resp. (ii)) is difficult. Furthermore, under
this slightly stronger assumption (i.e., (i) is difficult, called (k, n)-MSDHS from now on), we can
construct a VC scheme Πpe (see Fig. 2) that is more efficient than the one based on (k, n)-MSDH. In
Section 3.1, we present the scheme Πpe based on (k, n)-MSDHS.
Definition 2.3 ((k, n)-MSDHS) For any PPT algorithm A, Pr[A(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
p/s
k ] <
neg(λ), where the probability is taken over Γk ← G(1λ, k), s← ZN and A’s random coins.
The k-Multilinear Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption (k-MDDH) was suggested in [14, 15]: Given
gs1, g
a1
1 , . . . , g
ak
1 ← G1, it is difficult for any PPT algorithm to distinguish between gsa1···akk and h← Gk.
Definition 2.4 (k-MDDH) For any PPT algorithm A, |Pr[A(p, q,Γk, gs1, ga11 , . . . , gak1 , gsa1···akk ) = 1]−
Pr[A(p, q,Γk, gs1, ga11 , . . . , gak1 , h) = 1]| < neg(λ), where the probabilities are taken over Γk ← G(1λ, k),
s, a1, . . . , ak ← ZN , h← Gk and A’s random coins.
Let Γ3 = (N,G1, G2, G3, e, g1, g2, g3) ← G(1λ, 3) be a random trilinear map instance. Let h1 = gp1
and h2 = g
p
2 . The trilinear co-Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption for the order q Subgroups
(3-co-CDHS) says that given ha1 ← G1 and hb2 ← G2, it is difficult for any PPT algorithm to compute
hab2 .
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Definition 2.5 (3-co-CDHS) For any PPT algorithm A, Pr[A(p, q,Γ3, ha1, hb2) = hab2 ] < neg(λ), where
the probability is taken over Γ3 ← G(1λ, 3), a, b← ZN and A’s random coins.
Based on the following technical Lemma 2.3, Lemma 2.4 shows that 3-co-CDHS is not a new assump-
tion but weaker than 3-MDDH (see Appendix C and D for their proofs).
Lemma 2.3 Let X and Y be two uniform random variables over ZN . Then the random variable
Z = pXY mod q is statistically close to the uniform random variable U over Zq, i.e., we have that∑
ω∈Zq |Pr[Z = ω]− Pr[U = ω]| < neg(λ).
Lemma 2.4 If 3-MDDH holds, then 3-co-CDHS holds.
The Decision LINear assumption (DLIN) has been suggested in [5] for cyclic groups that admit
bilinear maps. In this paper, we use the DLIN assumption on the groups of Γ3.
Definition 2.6 (DLIN) Let G be a cyclic group of order N = pq, where p, q are λ-bit primes. For any
PPT algorithm A, |Pr[A(p, q, u, v, w, ua, vb, wa+b) = 1] − Pr[A(p, q, u, v, w, ua, vb, wc) = 1]| < neg(λ),
where the probabilities are taken over u, v, w ← G, a, b, c← ZN and A’s random coins.
2.2 Generalized BGN Encryption
BGN2 [6] allows one to evaluate quadratic polynomials on encrypted inputs (see Section 1.1). Boneh
et al. [6] noted that this property arises from the bilinear map and a k-multilinear map would enable
the evaluation of degree-k polynomials on encrypted inputs. Let M be a polynomial size domain, i.e.
|M| = poly(λ). Below we generalize BGN2 and define BGNk = (Gen,Enc,Dec) for any k ≥ 2, where
• (pk, sk)← Gen(1λ, k) is a key generation algorithm. It picks Γk as in (1) and then outputs both
a public key pk = (Γk, g1, h) and a secret key sk = p, where h = u
q for u← G1.
• c← Enc(pk,m) is an encryption algorithm which encrypts any message m ∈ M as a ciphertext
c = gm1 h
r ∈ G1, where r ← ZN .
• m← Dec(sk, c) is a decryption algorithm which takes as input sk and a ciphertext c, and outputs
a message m ∈M such that cp = (gp1)m.
Note that all algorithms above are defined over G1 but in general they can be defined over Gi for any
i ∈ [k]. This can be done by setting pk = (Γk, gi, h) and replacing any occurrence of g1 with gi, where
h = uq for u← Gi. Similar to [6], one can show that BGNk is semantically secure under the SDA.
Below we discuss useful properties of BGNk. For every integer 2 ≤ i ≤ k, we define a map ei :
G1×· · ·×G1 → Gi such that ei(ga11 , . . . , gai1 ) = ga1···aii for any a1, . . . , ai ∈ ZN . Firstly, we shall see that
BGNk allows us to compute Enc(m1 · · ·mk) from Enc(m1), . . . ,Enc(mk). Suppose Enc(mℓ) = gmℓ1 hrℓ
for every ℓ ∈ [k], where h = gqδ1 for some δ ∈ ZN and rℓ ← ZN . Let hk = ek(h, g1, . . . , g1) = gqδk . Then
ek(Enc(m1), . . . ,Enc(mk)) = g
m
k h
r
k is a ciphertext of m = m1 · · ·mk in Gk, where r = 1qδ (
∏k
ℓ=1(mℓ +
qδrℓ)−m).
Computing ρ with reduced multi-linearity level. In Πpe, the client gives a polynomial f(x) =
f0 + f1x + · · · + fnxn and k ciphertexts σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σk) of α,α2, . . . , α2k−1 under BGN2k+1 to
the server and the server returns ρ = Enc(f(α)), where k = ⌈log(n + 1)⌉. Below we show how to
compute the ρ using σ and f(x). Suppose σℓ = g
α2
ℓ−1
1 h
rℓ for every ℓ ∈ [k], where h = gqδ1 for some
δ ∈ ZN and rℓ ← ZN . Clearly, any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} has a binary representation (i1, . . . , ik) such
that i =
∑k
ℓ=1 iℓ2
ℓ−1. Then αi = αi1 · (α2)i2 · · · (α2k−1)ik is the product of i1 + · · · + ik elements
of {α,α2, . . . , α2k−1}. For every ℓ ∈ [k], let φℓ = σℓ if iℓ = 1 and φℓ = g1 otherwise. Then ρi ,
ek(φ1, . . . , φk) = g
µi
k = g
m
k h
r
k is a ciphertext ofm = α
i under BGN2k+1, where µi =
∏k
ℓ=1(α
2ℓ−1+qδrℓ)
iℓ
and r = 1qδ (µi −m). Thus, ρ =
∏n
i=0 ρ
fi
i is a ciphertext of f(α) under BGN2k+1.
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Computing π with reduced multi-linearity level. In Πpe, k+1 group elements ~ξ = (g1, g
s
1, . . . , g
s2
k−1
1 )
are also known to the server as part of the public key, where s ← ZN . The server must return
π = Enc(c(s)) as the proof that ρ = Enc(f(α)) has been correctly computed. Below we show how to
compute π using ~ξ and σ. Note that c(s) = (f(s)− f(α))/(s−α) =∑n−1i=0 ∑ij=0 fi+1αjsi−j. It suffices
to show how to compute πij , Enc(fi+1α
jsi−j) for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i}.
Let (j1, . . . , jk), (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ {0, 1}k be the binary representations of j and i − j, respectively. Let
φℓ = σℓ if jℓ = 1 and φℓ = g1 otherwise. Let ψℓ = g
s2
ℓ−1
1 if iℓ = 1 and ψℓ = g1 otherwise. Then it is
easy to see that πij = e(ek(φ1, . . . , φk), ek(ψ1, . . . , ψk)) = g
νij
2k = g
m
2kh
r
2k is a ciphertext of m = α
jsi−j,
where νij = s
i−j∏k
ℓ=1(α
2ℓ−1 + qδrℓ)
jℓ , h2k = g
qδ
2k and r =
1
qδ (νij −m). Let ν =
∑n−1
i=0
∑i
j=0 fi+1νij .
Thus, π , gν2k =
∏n−1
i=0
∏i
j=0 π
fi+1
ij = Enc(c(s)).
2.3 Algebraic PRFs with Closed Form Efficiency
In Πmm, the client gives both a square matrix M = (Mij) of order n and its blinded version T = (Tij)
to the server. The computation of T requires an algebraic PRF with closed form efficiency, which
has very efficient algorithms for certain computations on large data. Formally, an algebraic PRF with
closed form efficiency is a pair PRF = (KG,F), where KG(1λ, pp) generates a secret key K from any
public parameter pp and FK : I → G is a function with domain I and range G (both specified by
pp). We say that PRF has pseudorandom property if for any pp and any PPT algorithm A, it holds
that |Pr[AFK(·)(1λ, pp) = 1] − Pr[AR(·)(1λ, pp) = 1]| < neg(λ), where the probabilities are taken over
the randomness of KG,A and the random function R : I → G. Consider an arbitrary computation
Comp that takes as input R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Gn and x = (x1, . . . , xn), and assume that the best
algorithm to compute Comp(R1, . . . , Rn, x1, . . . , xn) takes time t. Let z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ In. We say
that PRF has closed form efficiency for (Comp, z) if there is an efficient algorithm CFE such that
CFEComp,z(K,x) = Comp(FK(z1), . . . ,FK(zn), x1, . . . , xn) and its running time is o(t).
A PRF with closed form efficiency. Fiore et al. [13] constructed an algebraic PRF with closed form
efficiency PRFdlin based on the DLIN assumption for the bilinear groups. We generalize it over trilinear
groups. In the generalized setting, KG generates Γ3 ← G(1λ, 3), picks αi, βi ← ZN , Ai, Bi ← G1
for every i ∈ [n], and outputs K = {αi, βi, Ai, Bi : i ∈ [n]}. The function FK maps any pair
(i, j) ∈ [n]2 to FK(i, j) = Aαij Bβij . The closed form efficiency of PRFdlin is described as below.
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ ZnN . The computation Comp we consider is computing
∏n
j=1 FK(i, j)
xj for
all i ∈ [n]. Clearly, it requires Ω(n2) exponentiations if no CFE is available. However, one can
precompute A = Ax11 · · ·Axnn and B = Bx11 · · ·Bxnn and have that
∏n
j=1 FK(i, j)
xj = AαiBβi for every
i ∈ [n]. Computing AαiBβi requires 2 exponentiations and hence the PRFdlin has closed form efficiency
for (Comp, z), where z = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ [n]}. The PRFdlin in [13] is pseudorandom merely based on the
DLIN for bilinear groups. Similarly, the generalized PRFdlin is also pseudorandom based on the DLIN
assumption for trilinear groups. Consequently, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.5 If DLIN holds in the trilinear setting, then PRFdlin is an algebraic PRF with closed form
efficiency.
2.4 Verifiable Computation
Verifiable computation [16, 3, 13] is a two-party protocol between a client and a server, where the
client gives encodings of its function f and input x to the server, the server returns an encoding of
f(x) along with a proof, and finally the client efficiently verifies the server’s computation. Formally,
a VC scheme Π = (KeyGen,ProbGen,Compute,Verify) is defined by four algorithms, where
• (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ, f) takes as input a security parameter λ and a function f , and generates
both a public key pk and a secret key sk;
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• (σ, τ)← ProbGen(sk, x) takes as input the secret key sk and an input x, and generates both an
encoded input σ and a verification key τ ;
• (ρ, π)← Compute(pk, σ) takes as input the public key pk and an encoded input σ, and produces
both an encoded output ρ and a proof π;
• {f(x),⊥} ← Verify(sk, τ, ρ, π) takes as input the secret key sk, the verification key τ , the encoded
output ρ and a proof π, and outputs either f(x) or ⊥ (which indicates that ρ is not valid).
Correctness. The scheme Π should be correct. Intuitively, the scheme Π is correct if an honest
server always outputs a pair (ρ, π) that gives the correct computation result. Let F be a family of
functions.
Definition 2.7 The scheme Π is said to be F-correct if for any f ∈ F , any (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ, f),
any input x to f , any (σ, τ) ← ProbGen(sk, x), any (ρ, π) ← Compute(pk, σ), it holds that f(x) =
Verify(sk, τ, ρ, π).
Experiment ExpVerA (Π, f, λ)
1. (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ, f);
2. for i = 1 to l = poly(λ) do
3. xi ← A(pk, x1, σ1, . . . , xi−1, σi−1);
4. (σi, τi)← ProbGen(sk, xi);
5. xˆ← A(pk, x1, σ1, . . . , xl, σl)
6. (σˆ, τˆ )← ProbGen(sk, xˆ);
7. (ρ¯, π¯)← A(pk, x1, σ1, . . . , xl, σl, σˆ)
8. y¯ ← Verify(sk, τˆ , ρ¯, π¯);
9. output 1 if y¯ /∈ {f(xˆ),⊥} and 0 otherwise.
Experiment ExpPriA (Π, f, λ)
1. (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ, f);
2. (x0, x1)← APubProbGen(sk,·)(pk);
3. b← {0, 1};
4. (σ, τ)← ProbGen(sk, xb);
5. b′ ← APubProbGen(sk,·)(pk, x0, x1, σ)
6. output 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise.
Remark: PubProbGen(sk, ·) takes as input x, runs
(σ, τ)← ProbGen(sk, x) and returns σ.
Figure 1: Experiments for security and privacy [16]
Security. The scheme Π should be secure. As in [16], we say that the scheme Π is secure if no
untrusted server can cause the client to accept an incorrect computation result with a forged proof.
This intuition can be formalized by an experiment ExpVerA (Π, f, λ) (see Fig. 1) where the challenger
plays the role of the client and the adversary A plays the role of the untrusted server.
Definition 2.8 The scheme Π is said to be F-secure if for any f ∈ F and any PPT adversary A, it
holds that Pr[ExpVerA (Π, f, λ) = 1] < neg(λ).
Privacy. The client’s input should be hidden from the server in Π. As in [16], we define input privacy
based on the intuition that no untrusted server can distinguish between different inputs of the client.
This is formalized by an experiment ExpPriA (Π, f, λ) (see Fig. 1) where the challenger plays the role of
the client and the adversary A plays the role of the untrusted server.
Definition 2.9 The scheme Π is said to achieve input privacy if for any function f ∈ F , any PPT
algorithm A, it holds that Pr[ExpPriA (Π, f, λ) = 1] < neg(λ).
Efficiency. The algorithms ProbGen and Verify will be run by the client for each evaluation of the
outsourced function f . Their running time should be substantially less than evaluating f .
Definition 2.10 The scheme Π is said to be outsourced if for any f ∈ F and any input x to f , the
running time of ProbGen and Verify is o(t), where t is the time required to compute f(x).
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3 Our Schemes
3.1 Univariate Polynomial Evaluation
In this section, we present our VC scheme Πpe with input privacy (see Fig. 2) for univariate polynomial
evaluation. In Πpe, the client outsources a degree n polynomial f(x) = f0 + f1x+ · · ·+ fnxn ∈ Zq[x]
to the server and may evaluate f(α) for any input α ∈ D ⊆ Zq, where q is a λ-bit prime not known to
the server and |D| = poly(λ). Our scheme uses a (2k + 1)-multilinear map instance Γ with groups of
order N = pq, where k = ⌈log(n+ 1)⌉ and p is also a λ-bit prime not known to the server. The client
stores t = g
f(s)
1 and gives (g
s
1, g
s2
1 . . . , g
s2
k−1
1 , f) to the server, where s← ZN . It also sets up BGN2k+1
based on Γ. In order to verifiably compute f(α), the client gives σ = (σ1, . . . , σk) to the server and
the server returns ρ = Enc(f(α)) along with π = Enc(c(s)), where σℓ = Enc(α
2ℓ−1) for every ℓ ∈ [k]
and (ρ, π) is computed using the techniques in Section 2.2. At last, the client decrypts ρ to y and
verifies if the equation (2) holds.
• KeyGen(1λ, f(x)): Pick Γ = (N,G1, . . . , G2k+1, e, g1, . . . , g2k+1)← G(1λ, 2k + 1). Pick s ← ZN
and compute t = g
f(s)
1 . Pick u ← G1 and compute h = uq, where u = gδ1 for an integer
δ ∈ ZN . Set up BGN2k+1 with public key (Γ, g1, h) and secret key p. Output sk = (p, q, s, t)
and pk = (Γ, g1, h; g
s
1, g
s2
1 , . . . , g
s2
k−1
1 ; f).
• ProbGen(sk, α): For every ℓ ∈ [k], pick rℓ ← ZN and compute σℓ = gα2
ℓ−1
1 h
rℓ . Output
σ = (σ1, . . . , σk) and τ =⊥ (τ is not used).
• Compute(pk, σ): Compute ρi = gµik for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} using the technique in Section 2.2.
Compute ρ =
∏n
i=0 ρ
fi
i . Compute πij = g
νij
2k for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} and j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i}
using the technique in Section 2.2. Compute π =
∏n−1
i=0
∏i
j=0 π
fi+1
ij . Output ρ and π.
• Verify(sk, τ, ρ, π): Compute the y ∈ Zq such that ρp = (gpk)y. If
e
(
t/gy1 , g
p
2k
)
= e
(
gs1/g
α
1 , π
p
)
, (2)
then output y; otherwise, output ⊥.
Figure 2: Univariate polynomial evaluation (Πpe)
Correctness. The correctness of Πpe requires that the client always outputs f(α) as long as the
server is honest, i.e., y = f(α) and (2) holds. It is shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 If the server is honest, then y = f(α) and (2) holds.
Proof: Firstly, pµi ≡ pαi mod N for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. Since gk is of order N , we have that
ρp =
n∏
i=0
ρpfii =
n∏
i=0
gpµifik =
n∏
i=0
gpfiα
i
k =
(
gpk
)f(α)
,
which implies that y = f(α). Secondly, pνij = pα
jsi−j mod N for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i}. Thus,
πp =
n−1∏
i=0
i∏
j=0
π
pfi+1
ij =
n−1∏
i=0
i∏
j=0
g
pνijfi+1
2k =
n−1∏
i=0
i∏
j=0
g
pfi+1αjsi−j
2k = g
c(s)
2k .
It follows that e
(
gs1/g
α
1 , π
p
)
= g
(s−α)c(s)
2k+1 = g
f(s)−f(α)
2k+1 = e
(
t/gy1 , g
p
2k
)
, i.e, the equality (2) holds. 
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Security. The security of Πpe requires that no untrusted server can cause the client to accept a value
y¯ 6= f(α) with a forged proof. It is based on the (2k+1, n)-MSDHS assumption (see Definition 2.2).
Lemma 3.2 If (2k + 1, n)-MSDHS holds for Γ, then the scheme Πpe is secure.
Proof: Suppose that Πpe is not secure. Then there is a PPT adversary A that breaks its security
with non-negligible probability ǫ1. We shall construct a PPT simulator B that simulates A and breaks
the (2k + 1, n)-MSDHS for Γ. The simulator B takes as input (p, q,Γ, g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 ), where s← ZN .
The simulator B is required to output gp/s2k+1. In order to do so, B simulates A as below:
(A) Pick a polynomial f(x) = f0 + f1x+ · · ·+ fnxn ∈ Zq[x]. Pick u← G1, compute h = uq and set
up BGN2k+1 with public key (Γ, g1, h) and secret key p. Pick β ← D and implicitly set sˆ = s+β
(sˆ is not known to B). Mimic KeyGen by sending pk = (Γ, g1, h, gsˆ1, gsˆ
2
1 . . . , g
sˆ2
k−1
1 , f) to A (note
that B can compute gsˆ2ℓ−11 for every ℓ ∈ [k] based on the knowledge of β and g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 ).
Set sk = (p, q, t), where t = g
f(sˆ)
1 (note that sk does not include sˆ as a component because sˆ is
neither known to B nor used by B);
(B) Upon receiving α ∈ D from A, mimic ProbGen as below: pick rℓ ← ZN and compute σℓ =
gα
2
ℓ−1
1 h
rℓ for every ℓ ∈ [k]; send σ = (σ1, . . . , σk) to A.
It is trivial to verify that the pk and σ generated by B are identically distributed to those generated
by the client in an execution of Πpe. We remark that (A) is the step 1 in Exp
Ver
A (Π, f, λ) (see Fig. 1)
and (B) consists of steps 3 and 4 in ExpVerA (Π, f, λ). Furthermore, (B) may be run l = poly(λ) times as
described by step 2 of ExpVerA (Π, f, λ). After l executions of (B), the adversary A will provide an input
αˆ on which he is willing to be challenged. If αˆ 6= β, then the simulator B aborts; otherwise, it continues.
Note that both β and αˆ are from the same polynomial size domain D, the event that αˆ = β will occur
with probability ǫ2 ≥ 1/|D|, which is non-negligible. If the simulator B does not abort, it next runs
(σˆ, τˆ) ← ProbGen(sk, αˆ) and gives A an encoded input σˆ. Then the adversary A may maliciously
reply with (ρ¯, π¯) such that Verify(sk, τˆ , ρ¯, π¯) , y¯ /∈ {f(αˆ),⊥}. On the other hand, an honest server in
Πpe will reply with (ρˆ, πˆ). Due to Theorem 3.1, it must be the case that Verify(sk, τˆ , ρˆ, πˆ) , yˆ = f(αˆ).
Note that the event that y¯ /∈ {f(αˆ),⊥} occurs with probability ǫ1. Suppose the event y¯ /∈ {f(αˆ),⊥}
occurs, then the equation (2) is satisfied by both (y¯, π¯) and (yˆ, πˆ), i.e.,
e
(
t/gy¯1 , g
p
2k
)
= e
(
gsˆ1/g
αˆ
1 , π¯
p
)
and e
(
t/gyˆ1 , g
p
2k
)
= e
(
gsˆ1/g
αˆ
1 , πˆ
p
)
. (3)
The equalities in (3) imply that e
(
gy¯−yˆ1 , g
p
2k
)
= e
(
gsˆ−αˆ1 ,
(
πˆ/π¯
)p)
. Hence,
g
p
sˆ−αˆ
2k+1 = e
(
g1,
(
πˆ/π¯
)p) 1
y¯−yˆ . (4)
Note that the left hand side of (4) is g
p/s
2k+1 due to β = αˆ. Therefore, (4) means that the simulator
B can break the (2k + 1, n)-MSDHS assumption (Definition 2.3) with probability ǫ = ǫ1ǫ2, which is
non-negligible and contradicts to the (2k + 1, n)-MSDHS assumption. Hence, under the (2k + 1, n)-
MSDHS assumption, ǫ1 must be negligible in λ, i.e., the scheme Πpe is secure. 
Privacy. The input privacy of Πpe requires that no untrusted server can distinguish between different
inputs of the client. This is formally defined by the experiment ExpPriA (Π, f, λ) in Fig. 1. The client
in our VC scheme encrypts its input α using BGN2k+1 which is semantically secure under SDA for Γ.
As a result, our VC scheme achieves input privacy under SDA for Γ (see Appendix E for a proof of
the following lemma).
Lemma 3.3 If SDA holds for Γ, then the scheme Πpe achieves the input privacy.
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Efficiency. In order to verifiably compute f(α) with the cloud, the client computes k = ⌈log(n+ 1)⌉
ciphertexts σ1, . . . , σk under BGN2k+1 in the execution of ProbGen; it also decrypts one ciphertext
ρ = Enc(f(α)) under BGN2k+1 and then verifies the equation (2). The overall computation of the
client will be O(log n) = o(n) and therefore Πpe is outsourced. On the other hand, the server needs
to perform O(n2 log n) multilinear map computations and O(n2) exponentiations in each execution of
Compute, which is comparable with the VC schemes based on FHE. Based on Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, 3.3
and the efficiency analysis, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 If the (2k + 1, n)-MSDHS and SDA assumptions for Γ both hold, then Πpe is a VC
scheme with input privacy.
A variant of Πpe based on (2k + 1, n)-MSDH. The VC scheme Πpe we constructed in this section
has its security based on the (2k + 1, n)-MSDHS which is slightly stronger than the (2k + 1, n)-
MSDH. The (2k+1, n)-MSDH implies that except for a negligible fraction of the (2k+1)-multilinear
map instances, at least one of the following problems is difficult for any PPT algorithm: (i) given
g1, g
s
1, . . . , g
sn
1 , compute g
p/s
1 ; (ii) given g1, g
s
1, . . . , g
sn
1 , compute g
q/s
1 . While it is not known how to
determine which one of the two problems is difficult for a given Γ2k+1 instance, the construction of Πpe
simply assumes one of them is always difficult. In fact, we can also construct a VC scheme with input
privacy for univariate polynomial evaluation based on the weaker assumption (2k + 1, n)-MSDH. A
natural idea is generating multiple (2k+1)-multilinear map instances, say Γ2k+1,1, . . . ,Γ2k+1,λ, where
Γ2k+1,l is defined over groups of order Nl = plql for every l ∈ [λ]. The client can simply run one instance
of Πpe based on each one of the λ multilinear map instances Γ2k+1,1, . . . ,Γ2k+1,λ. In particular, in
each execution, the client simply picks a random one from the two problems and believe that the
chosen problem is difficult. It will base that execution on the hardness of the chosen problem. The
client will not accept the λ computation results from the λ executions of Πpe except all of them agree
with each other and passes their respective verifications. The client will output a wrong computation
result only when the λ chosen problems are all easy and the server turns out to be able to break all
of them. However, this will happen with probability at most 2−λ, which is negligible. Therefore, this
modified scheme will be secure merely based on (2k + 1, n)-MSDH. Surely, as the price of using a
weaker assumption, the resulting scheme incurs a λ overhead to the computation and communication
complexities of every party in Πpe, which however is acceptable in some scenarios because the λ is
independent of n.
3.2 Matrix Multiplication
In this section, we present our VC scheme Πmm with input privacy (see Fig. 3) for matrix multipli-
cation. In Πmm, the client outsources an n × n matrix M = (Mij) over Zq to the server and may
compute Mx for an input vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D ⊆ Znq , where q is a λ-bit prime not known
to the server and |D| = poly(λ). Our scheme uses a trilinear map instance Γ with groups of order
N = pq, where p is also a λ-bit prime not known to the server. In Πmm, the client gives both M and
its blinded version T = (Tij) to the server, where T is computed using the PRFdlin. It also sets up
BGN3. In order to verifiably computeMx, the client stores τ = (τ1, . . . , τn), where each τi is efficiently
computed using the closed form efficiency property of PRFdlin. It gives σ = (Enc(x1), . . . ,Enc(xn)) to
the server and the server returns ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn) = Enc(Mx) along with π = (π1, . . . , πn). At last,
the client decrypts ρi to yi and verify if (5) holds for every i ∈ [n].
Correctness. The correctness of Πmm requires that the client always outputs Mx as long as the
server is honest, i.e., y =Mx and (5) holds for every i ∈ [n]. It is shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4 If the server is honest, then y =Mx and (5) holds for every i ∈ [n].
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• KeyGen(1λ,M): Pick a trilinear map instance Γ = (N,G1, G2, G3, e, g1, g2, g3) ← G(1λ, 3).
Consider the PRFdlin in Section 2.3. Run KG(1
λ, n) and pick a secret key K. Pick a ← ZN
and compute Tij = g
p2aMij
1 · FK(i, j) for every (i, j) ∈ [n]2. Pick u← G1 and compute h = uq.
Set up BGN3 with public key (Γ, g1, h) and secret key p. Output sk = (p, q,K, a, η) and
pk = (Γ, g1, h,M, T ), where η = g
p2a
3 .
• ProbGen(sk, x): For every j ∈ [n], pick rj ← ZN and compute σj = gxj1 hrj . For every i ∈ [n],
compute τi = e(
∏n
j=1 FK(i, j)
xj , gp2) using the efficient CFE algorithm in Section 2.3. Output
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) and τ = (τ1, . . . , τn).
• Compute(pk, σ): Compute ρi =
∏n
j=1 σ
Mij
j and πi =
∏n
j=1 e(Tij , σj) for every i ∈ [n]. Output
ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn) and π = (π1, . . . , πn).
• Verify(sk, τ, ρ, π): For every i ∈ [n], compute yi such that ρpi = (gp1)yi . If
e(πi, g
p
1) = η
pyi · τi (5)
for every i ∈ [n], then output y = (y1, . . . , yn); otherwise output ⊥.
Figure 3: Matrix multiplication (Πmm)
Proof: Firstly, σpj = g
pxj
1 for every j ∈ [n]. Thus we have that
ρpi =
n∏
j=1
σ
pMij
j =
n∏
j=1
g
pMijxj
1 =
(
gp1
)∑n
j=1Mijxj
for every i ∈ [n]. It follows that yi =
∑n
j=1Mijxj ∈ Zq for every i ∈ [n]. Hence, y = Mx. Secondly,
we have that
e(πi, g
p
1) =
n∏
j=1
e(e(Tij , σj), g
p
1) =
n∏
j=1
e(g
p2aMijxj
2 , g
p
1) · e(
n∏
j=1
FK(i, j)
xj , gp2) = η
pyi · τi,
i.e., the equality (5) holds. 
Security. The security of Πmm requires that no untrusted server can cause the client to accept
y¯ /∈ {Mx,⊥} with a forged proof. It is based on the 3-co-CDHS assumption for Γ (Lemma 2.4) and
the DLIN assumption (Definition 2.6).
Lemma 3.5 If the 3-co-CDHS assumption for Γ and the DLIN assumption both hold, then the scheme
Πmm is secure.
Proof: We define three games G0,G1 and G2 as below:
G0 : this is the standard security game Exp
Ver
A (Π,M, λ) defined in Fig. 1.
G1 : the only difference between this game and G0 is a change to ProbGen. For any (x1, . . . , xn)
queried by the adversary, instead of computing τ using the efficient CFE algorithm, the inefficient
evaluation of τi is used, i.e., τi =
∏n
j=1 e(FK(i, j)
xj , gp2) for every i ∈ [n].
G2 : the only difference between this game and G1 is that the matrix T is computed as Tij = g
p2aMij
1 ·
Rij, where Rij ← G1 for every i, j ∈ [n].
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For every i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, we denote by Gi(A) the output of game i when it is run with an adversary A.
The proof of the theorem proceeds by a standard hybrid argument, and is obtained by combining the
proofs of the following three claims.
Claim 1. We have that Pr[G0(A) = 1] = Pr[G1(A) = 1].
The only difference between G1 and G0 is in the computation of τ . Due to the correctness of
the CFE algorithm, such difference does not change the distribution of the values τ returned to the
adversary. Therefore, the probabilities that A wins in both games are identical.
Claim 2. We have that |Pr[G1(A) = 1]− Pr[G2(A) = 1]| < neg(λ).
The only difference between G2 and G1 is that we replace the pseudorandom group elements
FK(i, j) with truly random group elements Rij ← G1 for every i, j ∈ [n]. Clearly, if |Pr[G1(A) =
1] − Pr[G2(A) = 1]| is non-negligible, we can construct an simulator B that simulates A and breaks
the pseudorandom property of PRF with a non-negligible advantage.
Claim 3. We have that Pr[G2(A) = 1] < neg(λ).
Suppose that there is a PPT adversary A that wins with non-negligible probability ǫ in G2. We
want to construct a PPT simulator B that simulates A and breaks the 3-co-CDHS assumption (see
Definition 2.5) with non-negligible probability. The adversary B takes as input a tuple (p, q,Γ, hα1 , hβ2 ),
where h1 = g
p
1 , h2 = g
p
2 and α, β ← ZN . The adversary B is required to output hαβ2 . In order to do
so, B simulates A as below:
(A) Pick an n× n matrix M and mimic the KeyGen of game G2 as below:
• implicitly set a = αβ by computing η = e(hα1 , hβ2 ) = gp
2αβ
3 ;
• pick u← G1, compute h = uq and set up BGN3 with public key (Γ, g1, h) and secret key p;
• pick Tij ← G1 for every i, j ∈ [n] and send pk = (Γ, g1, h,M, T ) to A, where T = (Tij);
(B) Upon receiving a query x = (x1, . . . , xn) from A, mimic ProbGen as below:
• for every j ∈ [n], pick rj ← ZN and compute σj = gxj1 hrj ;
• for every i, j ∈ [n], compute Zij = e(Tij , gpxj2 )/ηpMijxj ;
• for every i ∈ [n], compute τi =
∏n
j=1 Zij;
• send σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) to A.
It is straightforward to verify that the pk, σ and τ generated by B are identically distributed to those
generated by the client in game G2. We remark that (A) is the step 1 in Exp
Ver
A (Π,M, λ) (see Fig. 1)
and (B) consists of steps 3 and 4 in ExpVerA (Π,M, λ). Furthermore, (B) may be run l = poly(λ) times
as described by step 2 of ExpVerA (Π,M, λ). After l executions of (B), the adversary A will provide an
input xˆ = (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn) on which he is willing to be challenged. Upon receiving xˆ, the simulator B
mimics ProbGen as (B) and gives A an encoded input σˆ. Then the adversary A may maliciously reply
with ρ¯ = (ρ¯1, . . . , ρ¯n) and π¯ = (π¯1, . . . , π¯n) such that Verify(sk, τˆ , ρ¯, π¯) , y¯ /∈ {Mxˆ,⊥}. On the other
hand, an honest server in our VC scheme will reply with ρˆ = (ρˆ1, . . . , ρˆn) and πˆ = (πˆ1, . . . , πˆn). Due
to Lemma 3.4, it must be the case that Verify(sk, τˆ , ρˆ, πˆ) , yˆ =Mxˆ. Note that the event y¯ /∈ {Mxˆ,⊥}
occurs with probability ǫ. Suppose it occurs. Then there is an integer i ∈ [n] such that y¯i 6= yˆi. Note
that neither y¯ nor yˆ is ⊥, the equation (5) must be satisfied by both (y¯, π¯) and (yˆ, πˆ), which translates
into e(π¯i, g
p
1) = η
py¯i · τˆi and e(πˆi, gp1) = ηpyˆi · τˆi, we have that
e(πˆi/π¯i, g
p
1) = η
p(yˆi−y¯i) = e(gp
2αβ(yˆi−y¯i)
2 , g
p
1),
which in turn implies that πˆi/π¯i = g
pαβ·p(yˆi−y¯i)
2 . Let φ ∈ Z∗q be the multiplicative inverse of p(yˆi− y¯i) ∈
Z
∗
q. Then g
pαβ
2 = (πˆi/π¯i)
φ, i.e., hαβ2 = (πˆi/π¯i)
φ, which implies that B can break the 3-co-CDHS with
probability at least ǫ. Therefore, this ǫ must be negligible in λ, i.e., Pr[G2(A) = 1] < neg(λ). 
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Privacy. The input privacy of Πmm requires that no untrusted server can distinguish between different
inputs of the client. This is formally defined by the experiment ExpPriA (Π, f, λ) in Fig. 1. The client in
our VC scheme encrypts its input x using BGN3 which is semantically secure under SDA for Γ. As a
result, Πmm achieves input privacy under SDA for Γ (see Appendix ?? for proof).
Lemma 3.6 If the SDA for Γ holds, then Πmm achieves the input privacy.
Efficiency. In order to verifiably compute Mx with the cloud, the client computes n ciphertexts
σ1, . . . , σk under BGN3 and n verification keys τ1, . . . , τn in the execution of ProbGen; it also decrypts
n ciphertext ρ = Enc(Mx) under BGN3 and then verifies the equation (5). The overall computation
of the client will be O(n) = o(n2) and therefore Πpe is outsourced. On the other hand, the server
needs to perform O(n2) multilinear map computations and O(n) exponentiations in each execution of
Compute, which is comparable with the VC schemes based on FHE. Based on Lemmas 3.4, 3.5, 3.6
and the efficiency analysis, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 If the 3-co-CDHS, DLIN and SDA assumptions for Γ all hold, then Πmm is a VC
scheme with input privacy.
3.3 Discussions
A theoretical limitation of our VC schemes Πpe and Πmm is that the computation results (i.e., f(α) and
Mx) must belong to a polynomial size domain M since otherwise the client will not be able to decrypt
ρ and then verify its correctness. However, we stress that this is not a real limitation when we apply
both schemes in outsourcing PIR (see Section 4) where the computation results are either 0 or 1. On
the other hand, with f(x) and the knowledge “f(α) ∈M” (resp. M and the knowledge “Mx ⊆M”),
one may argue that the cloud can also learn a polynomial size domain D where α (resp. Mx) is drawn
from and therefore guess the actual value of α (resp. x) with non-negligible probability. However,
recall that our privacy experiment ExpPriA (Π, f, λ) in Fig. 1 only requires the indistinguishability of
different inputs. This is achieved by Πpe and Πmm (though for polynomial size domains) and suffices
for our applications. Furthermore, in Section 3.4, we shall show how to modify Πpe and Πmm such
that the functions (i.e., f(x) and M) are encrypted and then given to the cloud. As a consequence,
the cloud learns no information on either the outsourced function or input unless it can break the
underlying encryption scheme.
3.4 Function Privacy
Note that Πpe and Πmm only achieve input privacy. We say that a VC scheme achieves function
privacy if the server cannot learn any information about the outsourced function. A formal definition
of function privacy can be given using an experiment similar to ExpPriA (Π, f, λ). Both Πpe and Πmm
can be modified such that function privacy is also achieved. In the modified VC scheme Π′pe (see
Fig. 4 in Appendix G), the client gives BGN2k+2 ciphertexts Enc(f) = (Enc(f0), . . . ,Enc(fn)) and
σ = (Enc(α), . . . ,Enc(α2
k−1
)) to the server. Then the server can compute ρ = Enc(f(α)) along with
a proof π = Enc(c(s)) using Enc(f) and σ. In the modified VC scheme Π′mm (see Fig. 5 in Appendix
G), the client gives BGN3 ciphertexts Enc(M) = (Enc(Mij)) and σ = (Enc(x1), . . . ,Enc(xn)) to the
server. Then the server can compute Enc(
∑n
j=1Mijxj) along with a proof πi using Enc(M) and σ for
every i ∈ [n]. It is not hard to prove that the schemes Π′pe and Π′mm are secure and achieve both input
and function privacy.
4 Applications
Our VC schemes have application in outsourcing private information retrieval (PIR). PIR [21] allows
a client to retrieve any bit wi of a database w = w1 · · ·wn ∈ {0, 1}n from a remote server without
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revealing i to the server. In a trivial solution of PIR, the client simply downloads w and extracts
wi. The main drawback of this solution is its prohibitive communication cost (i.e. n). In [21, 7, 17],
PIR schemes with non-trivial communication complexity o(n) have been constructed based on various
cryptographic assumptions. However, all of them assume that the server is honest-but-curious. In
real-life scenarios, the server may have strong incentive to give the client an incorrect response. Such
malicious behaviors may cause the client to make completely wrong decisions in its economic activities
(say the client is retrieving price information from a stock database and deciding in which stock it is
going to invest). Therefore, PIR schemes that are secure against malicious severs are very interesting.
In particular, outsoursing PIR to untrusted clouds in the modern age of cloud computing is very
interesting. Both of our VC schemes can provide easy solutions in outsourcing PIR. Using Πpe, the
client can outsource a degree n polynomial f(x) to the cloud, where f(i) = wi for every i ∈ [n]. To
privately retrieve wi, the client can execute Πpe with input i. In this solution, the communication cost
consists of O(log n) group elements. Using Πmm, the client can represent the w as a square matrix
M = (Mij) of order
√
n and delegate M to the cloud. To privately retrieve a bit Mij, the client can
execute Πmm with input x ∈ {0, 1}
√
n, where xj = 1 and all the other bits are 0. In this solution, the
communication cost consists of O(
√
n) group elements. Note that in our outsourced PIR schemes, the
computation results always belong to {0, 1} ⊆ M. Therefore, the theoretical limitation we discussed
in Section 3.3 does not really affect the application of our VC schemes in outsourcing PIR.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we constructed privacy preserving VC schemes for both univariate polynomial evaluation
and matrix multiplication, which have useful applications in outsourcing PIR. Our main tools are the
recently developed multilinear maps. A theoretical limitation of our constructions is that the results of
the computations should belong to a polynomial-size domain. Although this limitation does not really
affect their applications in outsourcing PIR, it is still interesting to remove it in the future works. We
also note that our VC schemes are only privately verifiable. It is also interesting to construct privacy
preserving VC schemes that are publicly verifiable.
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A Proof for Lemma 2.1
Lemma 2.1 If SDAi holds, then SDAj holds for every j = i+ 1, . . . , k.
Suppose there is a PPT algorithm A such that
|Pr[v ← Gj : A(Γ, v) = 1]− Pr[v ← Gj : A(Γ, vq) = 1]| ≥ ǫ (6)
for some integer j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , k}. We shall construct a PPT algorithm B that breaks SDAi with
the same advantage, where the B is given a pair (Γ, u) and must decide whether u ← Gi or u = αq
for α ← Gi. On input (Γ, u), the algorithm B computes v = e(u, gj−i) and gives (Γ, v) to A. Upon
receiving the output bit b of A, the algorithm B will also output b. Clearly, v will be uniformly
distributed over Gj if u← Gi. On the other hand, v = e(α, gj−i)q ∈ Gj will be a random element of
order p if u = αq for α ← Gi. Due to (6), the algorithm B can distinguish the two cases for v with
advantage ǫ and therefore distinguish the two cases for u with the same advantage ǫ ( i.e., break SDAi
with advantage ǫ). Since SDAi holds, the ǫ must be negligible in the security parameter λ. Therefore,
SDAj must also hold for every j = i+ 1, . . . , k.
B Proof for Lemma 2.2
Lemma 2.2 If (k, n)-MSDH holds, then except for a negligible fraction of the k-multilinear map
instances Γk ← G(1λ, k), either Pr[A(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
p/s
k ] < neg(λ) for any PPT algorithm
A or Pr[A(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
q/s
k ] < neg(λ) for any PPT algorithm A, where the probabilities
are taken over s← ZN and A’s random coins.
Firstly, under the (k, n)-MSDH assumption, for any PPT algorithm A, we must have that
Pr[A(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1. . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
1/s
1 ] < neg(λ), (7)
where the probability is taken over Γk ← G(1λ, k), s← ZN and A’s random coins. This is true because
otherwise there would be a PPT algorithm which can find α = 0, compute g
1/(s+α)
1 with non-negligible
probability and therefore break the (k, n)-MSDH assumption.
Suppose there are ǫ fraction (ǫ non-negligible) of the k-multilinear map instances Γk ← G(1λ, k)
for each of which there are two PPT algorithms A1 and A2 such that
Pr[A1(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
p/s
k ] and Pr[A2(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
q/s
k ] (8)
are both non-negligible, where the probabilities are taken over s← ZN and the random coins of A1 and
A2. We call such an instance Γk excellent. Fix an excellent instance Γk. We say that s ∈ ZN is good if
Pr[A1(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
p/s
k ] is non-negligible and nice if Pr[A2(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
q/s
k ]
is non-negligible, where the probabilities are taken over the random coins of A1 and A2, respectively.
For every s ∈ ZN , define Xs and Ys to be two 0-1 random variables, where Xs = 1 iff s is good and
Ys = 1 iff s is nice. Due to (8), we must have that Pr[Xs = 1] , δ1 and Pr[Ys = 1] , δ2 are both non-
negligible, where the probabilities are taken over s← ZN . This so because otherwise both probabilities
in (8) would be negligible as they must be taken over s← ZN . Below we construct a simulator S that
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simulates A1 and A2 and contradicts to (7). The simulator S is given a tuple (p, q,Γk, g1, gs1, . . . , gs
n
1 )
and required to compute g
1/s
k , where s ← ZN . In order to do so the simulator S picks s1, s2 ← ZN
independently. Let sˆ1 = ss1 and sˆ2 = ss2. It feeds A1 and A2 with (p, q,Γk, g1, gsˆ11 , . . . , gsˆ
n
1
1 ) and
(p, q,Γk, g1, g
sˆ2
1 , . . . , g
sˆn
2
1 ), respectively. Note that the distributions of both sˆ1 and sˆ2 are statistically
close to the uniform distribution over ZN . Therefore, with probability ≥ δ1 − neg(λ), sˆ1 is good; with
probability ≥ δ2−neg(λ), sˆ2 is nice. As a consequence, with non-negligible probabilities A1 andA2 will
return g
p/sˆ1
1 and g
q/sˆ2
1 , respectively. As a consequence, the simulator S can compute gp/s1 and gq/s1 with
non-negligible probability since it knows s1 and s2. Let u, v be integers such that up+vq = 1. Then the
simulator S can furthermore compute g1/s1 = (gp/s1 )u(gq/s1 )v with the same (non-negligible) probability.
In other words, we have that Pr[S(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1. . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
1/s
1 ] is non-negligible for the fixed excel-
lent instance Γk, where the probability is taken over s← ZN and the random coins of S. Since the frac-
tion ǫ of excellent instances is also non-negligible, we have that Pr[S(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1. . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
1/s
1 ] ≥
Pr[A(p, q,Γk, g1, gs1. . . . , gs
n
1 ) = g
1/s
1 |Γk is excellent] Pr[Γk is excellent], which is also non-negligible and
contradicts to (7). The lemma follows.
C Proof for Lemma 2.3
Lemma 2.2 Let X and Y be two uniform random variables over ZN . Then the random variable
Z = pXY mod q is statistically close to the uniform random variable U over Zq, i.e., we have that∑
ω∈Zq |Pr[Z = ω]− Pr[U = ω]| < neg(λ).
Let W = XY mod N . Then Z = pW mod q. We firstly determine the distribution of W . Since
both X and Y are uniformly distributed over ZN , it is easy to see that
Pr[W = w] =
|{(x, y) ∈ Z2N : xy = w mod N}|
N2
for every w ∈ ZN . Therefore, it suffices to determine the number Nw of pairs (x, y) ∈ Z2N such that
xy = w mod N for every w ∈ ZN . Let S1 = {w : w = 0 mod p and w = 0 mod q}, S2 = {w :
w 6= 0 mod p and w 6= 0 mod q}, S3 = {w : w = 0 mod p and w 6= 0 mod q}, and S4 = {w : w 6=
0 mod p and w = 0 mod q}. Clearly, we have that |S1| = 1, |S2| = N − p − q + 1, |S3| = q − 1 and
|S4| = p− 1. Simple calculations show that
Nw =


4N − 2p− 2q + 1, if w ∈ S1;
N − p− q + 1, if w ∈ S2;
2N − 2p− q + 1, if w ∈ S3;
2N − p− 2q + 1, if w ∈ S4.
(9)
Next, we consider the map σ : ZN → Zq defined by σ(w) = pw mod q for every w ∈ ZN . It is not
hard to verify that σ|S1 and σ|S4 are zero maps, σ|S2 is a (p − 1)-to-1 map with range Z∗q, and σ|S3
is a 1-to-1 map with range Z∗q. It follows that σ
−1(0) = S1 ∪ S4, and
σ−1(ω) ⊆ S2 ∪ S3,
|σ−1(ω) ∩ S2| = p− 1,
|σ−1(ω) ∩ S3| = 1
(10)
for every ω ∈ Z∗q. Due to (9) and (10), the distribution of Z can be described by
Pr[Z = 0] =
1
N2
((4N − 2p− 2q + 1)|S1|+ (2N − p− 2q + 1)|S4|) = p(2N − p)
N2
and
Pr[Z = ω] =
1
N2
((N − p− q + 1)(p − 1) + (2N − 2p− q + 1)) = p
2(q − 1)
N2
,
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where ω ∈ Z∗q is arbitrary. It follows that
∑
ω∈Zq
∣∣Pr[Z = ω]− Pr[U = ω]∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣p(2N − p)N2 −
1
q
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣p
2(q − 1)
N2
− 1
q
∣∣∣∣ (q − 1) = 2(q − 1)q2 ,
which is negligible in the security parameter λ as q is a λ-bit prime.
D Proof for Lemma 2.4
Lemma 2.3 If 3-MDDH holds, then 3-co-CDHS also holds.
Suppose that the 3-co-CDHS does not hold. Then there is a PPT adversary A such that
Pr[A(p, q,Γ, ha1 , hb2) = hab2 ] ≥ ǫ, (11)
where ǫ is non-negligible, and the probability is taken over a, b ← ZN and the random coins of A.
We shall construct a PPT adversary B that breaks the 3-MDDH. The adversary B is given (p, q,Γ)
along with five group elements t = gs1, α = g
a
1 , β = g
b
1, γ = g
c
1 and h ← G3, where s, a, b, c ← ZN . It
must decide whether h = gsabc3 or not. In order to do so, B computes u = αp, v = e(β, γ)p = gpbc2 ,
gives (p, q,Γ, u, v) to A and receives w from A. Clearly, u ∈ G1 is is a random element of order q. On
the other hand, due to Lemma 2.3, the distribution of v = gpbc2 is statistically close to the uniform
distribution over the order q subgroup of G2. Therefore, equation (11) implies that
Pr[w = gpabc2 ] ≥ ǫ− neg(λ),
where the probability is taken over a, b, c← ZN and the random coins of A. Given t ∈ G1 and w ∈ G2,
B will compute σ = e(t, w) and compare with τ = hp. At last, B will output 1 if σ = τ and a random
bit ψ ∈ {0, 1} otherwise. Let E1 be the event that B(p, q,Γ, t, α, β, γ, h) = 1 when h = gsabc3 . Then
Pr[E1] = Pr[E1|w = gpabc2 ] Pr[w = gpabc2 ] + Pr[E1|w 6= gpabc2 ] Pr[w 6= gpabc2 ]
≥ Pr[w = gpabc2 ] +
1
2
(1− Pr[w = gpabc2 ]) ≥
1
2
+
1
2
ǫ− neg(λ).
(12)
Let E2 be the event that B(p, q,Γ, t, α, β, γ, h) = 1 when h← G3 is a random group element. Then
Pr[E2] = Pr[E2|w = gpabc2 ] Pr[w = gpabc2 ] + Pr[E2|w 6= gpabc2 ] Pr[w 6= gpabc2 ]. (13)
Let h = gδ3 for δ ← ZN . Let η ∈ ZN be fixed. It is not hard to see that Pr[hp = gpη3 ] = Pr[δ ≡
η mod q] = 1/q and Pr[hp = gη3 ] = Pr[pδ ≡ η mod N ] ≤ 1/q where the probability is taken over
δ ∈ ZN . It follows that
Pr[E2|w = gpabc2 ] = Pr[hp = gpsabc3 ] ≤
1
q
;
Pr[E2|w 6= gpabc2 ] = Pr[E2, hp = e(t, w)|w 6= gpabc2 ] + Pr[E2, hp 6= e(t, w)|w 6= gpabc2 ]
= Pr[hp = e(t, w)|w 6= gpabc2 ] +
1
2
Pr[hp 6= e(t, w)|w 6= gpabc2 ]
=
1
2
(1 + Pr[hp = e(t, w)|w 6= gpabc2 ]) ≤
1
2
+
1
2q
.
(14)
Due to (13) and (14), we have that
Pr[E2] ≤ 1
q
Pr[w = gpabc2 ] +
(
1
2
+
1
2q
)
(1− Pr[w = gpabc2 ])
≤ 1
q
+
(
1
2
+
1
2q
)
(1− ǫ+ neg(λ)) ≤ 1
2
− 1
2
ǫ+ neg(λ),
(15)
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where the second inequality follows from Pr[w = gpabc2 ] ≥ ǫ − neg(λ) and the third inequality follows
from the fact that 1/q is negligible in λ. Due to (12) and (15), we have that
|Pr[E1]− Pr[E2]| ≥ ǫ− neg(λ),
which says that 3-MDDH assumption can be broken with advantage at least ǫ − neg(λ), which is
non-negligible as long as ǫ is non-negligible. Hence, the 3-co-CDHS assumption must hold as long as
the 3-MDDH assumption holds.
E Proof for Lemma 3.3
Lemma 3.3 If SDA holds for Γ, then the scheme Πpe achieves the input privacy.
Let Γ be the multilinear map instance in Πpe. Given any input α, the only message that contains
information about α is σ = (σ1, . . . , σk), which is sent to the server by the client. Suppose that
there is an adversary A that breaks the input privacy of our scheme. Then A must succeed with a
non-negligible advantage ǫ in ExpPriA (Π, f, λ), i.e., Pr[Exp
Pri
A (Π, f, λ) = 1] ≥ 12 + ǫ. Below we construct
a simulator S that breaks the semantic security of BGN2k+1 with non-negligible advantage ≥ ǫ/k.
In the semantic security game of BGN2k+1, the challenger stores the secret key p locally and gives a
public key (Γ, g1, h) to S. To break BGN2k+1, the simulator S simulates A as below:
(A) Mimic ProbGen: Picks a polynomial f(x) = f0 + f1x+ · · ·+ fnxn. Picks s← ZN and computes
t = g
f(s)
1 . Stores sk = (s, t) and gives pk = (Γ, g1, h, g
s
1, g
s2
1 , . . . , g
s2
k−1
1 , f) to A. Note that sk
does not include p, q as components of sk. This is because p and q are neither known to the
simulator S nor used by the simulator S.
(B) Mimic PubProbGen(sk, ·): Upon receiving a query α ∈ D, picks rℓ ← ZN and computes σℓ =
gα
2
ℓ−1
1 h
rℓ for every ℓ ∈ [k]. Then gives σ = (σ1, . . . , σk) to A.
(C) Upon receiving α0, α1 ∈ D from A, the simulator S picks i← {0, 1, . . . , k−1} and sends β0 = α2i0
and β1 = α
2i
1 to the challenger. The challenger will pick b ← {0, 1} and sends Enc(βb) to S.
Upon receiving Enc(βb) from the challenger. The simulator S gives
Z = (Enc(α1), . . . ,Enc(α
2i−1
1 ),Enc(βb),Enc(α
2i+1
0 ), . . . ,Enc(α
2k−1
0 ))
to A and learns a bit b′ in return.
(D) The simulator S outputs bˆ = 1 if b′ = 1 and bˆ = 0 otherwise. It wins if bˆ = b.
For every j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, we define the following probability ensemble
Zj = (Enc(α1), . . . ,Enc(α
2j−1
1 ),Enc(α
2j
0 ), . . . ,Enc(α
2k−1
0 )).
Then Z0 = (Enc(α0),Enc(α
2
0), . . . ,Enc(α
2k−1
0 )) and Zk = (Enc(α1),Enc(α
2
1), . . . ,Enc(α
2k−1
1 )). The
inequality Pr[ExpPriA (Π, f, λ) = 1] ≥ 12 + ǫ implies that Pr[A(pk, Zk) = 1] − Pr[A(pk, Z0) = 1] ≥ 2ǫ.
Note that Z = Zi when b = 0 and Z = Zi+1 when b = 1. Let E be the event that bˆ = b. Then
Pr[E] =
k−1∑
l=0
Pr[E|i = l] Pr[i = l] = 1
k
k−1∑
l=0
(Pr[E|i = l, b = 0]Pr[b = 0] + Pr[E|i = l, b = 1]Pr[b = 1])
=
1
2k
k−1∑
l=0
(Pr[b′ = 0|i = l, b = 0] + Pr[b′ = 1|i = l, b = 1])
=
1
2k
k−1∑
l=0
(1− Pr[A(pk, Zl) = 1] + Pr[A(pk, Zl+1) = 1])
=
1
2
+
1
2k
(Pr[A(pk, Zk) = 1]− Pr[A(pk, Z0) = 1]) ≥ 1
2
+
ǫ
k
,
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i.e., B breaks the semantic security of BGN2k+1 with a non-negligible advantage ǫ/k, which is not true
when SDA holds. Hence, Πpe achieves input privacy.
F Proof for Lemma 3.6
Lemma 3.6 If the SDA for Γ holds, then Πmm achieves the input privacy.
We define three games G0,G1 and G2 as below:
G0 : this is the standard security game Exp
Pri
A (Π,M, λ) defined in Fig. 1.
G1 : the only difference between this game and G0 is a change to ProbGen. For any (x1, . . . , xn)
queried by the adversary, instead of computing τ using the efficient CFE algorithm, the inefficient
evaluation of τi is used, i.e., τi =
∏n
j=1 e(FK(i, j)
xj , gp2) for every i ∈ [n].
G2 : the only difference between this game and G1 is that the matrix T is computed as Tij = g
p2aMij
1 ·
Rij, where Rij ← G1 for every i, j ∈ [n].
For every i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, we denote by Gi(A) the output of game i when it is run with an adversary A.
The proof of the theorem proceeds by a standard hybrid argument, and is obtained by combining the
proofs of the following three claims.
Claim 1. We have that Pr[G0(A) = 1] = Pr[G1(A) = 1].
The only difference between G1 and G0 is in the computation of τ . Due to the correctness of
the CFE algorithm, such difference does not change the distribution of the values τ returned to the
adversary. Therefore, the probabilities that A wins in both games are identical.
Claim 2. We have that |Pr[G1(A) = 1]− Pr[G2(A) = 1]| < neg(λ).
The only difference between G2 and G1 is that we replace the pseudorandom group elements
FK(i, j) with truly random group elements Rij ← G1 for every i, j ∈ [n]. Clearly, if |Pr[G1(A) =
1] − Pr[G2(A) = 1]| is non-negligible, we can construct an simulator B that simulates A and breaks
the pseudorandom property of PRF with a non-negligible advantage.
Claim 3. We have that Pr[G2(A) = 1] < neg(λ).
Let Γ be the multilinear map instance in Πmm. Given any input x, the only message that contains
information about x is σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), which is sent to the server by the client. Suppose that there
is an adversary A that breaks the input privacy of our scheme. Then A must succeed with a non-
negligible advantage ǫ in ExpPriA (Π,M, λ), i.e., Pr[Exp
Pri
A (Π,M, λ) = 1] ≥ 12 + ǫ. Below we construct a
simulator S that breaks the semantic security of BGN3 with non-negligible advantage ≥ ǫ/n. In the
semantic security game of BGN3, the challenger stores the secret key p locally and gives a public key
(Γ, g1, h) to S. To break BGN3, the simulator S simulates A as below:
(A) Mimic ProbGen: Picks a square matrix M = (Mij) of order n. Picks a ← ZN . Computes
Tij = g
p2aMij
1 Rij for every (i, j) ∈ [n]2, where Rij ← G1. Stores sk = (a, η) and gives pk =
(Γ, g1, h,M, T ) to A, where η = gp
2a
3 . Note that sk does not include p, q as components of sk.
This is because p and q are neither known to the simulator S nor used by the simulator S.
(B) Mimic PubProbGen(sk, ·): Upon receiving a query x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D, picks rj ← ZN and
computes σj = g
xj
1 h
rj for every j ∈ [n]. Then gives σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) to A.
(C) Upon receiving x0, x1 ∈ D from A, the simulator S picks i← [n] and sends β0 = x0i and β1 = x1i
to the challenger (Here without loss of generality, we can suppose that the Hamming distance
between x0 and x1 is n. Otherwise, we can ignore their equal components and only consider
the different components.). The challenger will pick b ← {0, 1} and sends Enc(βb) to S. Upon
receiving Enc(βb) from the challenger. The simulator S gives
Z = (Enc(x11), . . . ,Enc(x
1
i−1),Enc(βb),Enc(x
0
i+1), . . . ,Enc(x
0
n))
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to A and learns a bit b′ in return.
(D) The simulator S outputs bˆ = 1 if b′ = 1 and bˆ = 0 otherwise. It breaks BGN3 if bˆ = b.
For every j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, we define the following probability ensemble
Zj = (Enc(x
1
1), . . . ,Enc(x
1
j ),Enc(x
0
j+1), . . . ,Enc(x
0
n)).
Then Z0 = (Enc(x
0
1),Enc(x
0
2), . . . ,Enc(x
0
n)) and Zn = (Enc(x
1
1),Enc(x
1
2), . . . ,Enc(x
1
n)). The inequality
Pr[ExpPriA (Π,M, λ) = 1] ≥ 12 + ǫ implies that Pr[A(pk, Zn) = 1] − Pr[A(pk, Z0) = 1] ≥ 2ǫ. Note that
Z = Zi−1 when b = 0 and Z = Zi when b = 1. Let E be the event that bˆ = b. Then
Pr[E] =
n∑
l=1
Pr[E|i = l] Pr[i = l] = 1
n
n∑
l=1
(Pr[E|i = l, b = 0]Pr[b = 0] + Pr[E|i = l, b = 1]Pr[b = 1])
=
1
2n
n∑
l=1
(Pr[b′ = 0|i = l, b = 0] + Pr[b′ = 1|i = l, b = 1])
=
1
2n
n∑
l=1
(1− Pr[A(pk, Zl−1) = 1] + Pr[A(pk, Zl) = 1])
=
1
2
+
1
2n
(Pr[A(pk, Zn) = 1]− Pr[A(pk, Z0) = 1]) ≥ 1
2
+
ǫ
n
,
i.e., B breaks the semantic security of BGN3 with a non-negligible advantage ǫ/n, which is not true
when SDA holds. Hence, Πmm achieves input privacy.
G Privacy Preserving VC Schemes
This section shows the modifications of our VC schemes Πpe and Πmm that achieve both input and
function privacy.
• KeyGen(1λ, f(x)): Pick Γ = (N,G1, . . . , G2k+2, e, g1, . . . , g2k+2)← G(1λ, 2k + 2). Pick s ← ZN
and compute t = g
f(s)
1 . Pick u ← G1 and compute h = uq, where u = gδ1 for an in-
teger δ ∈ ZN . Set up BGN2k+2 with public key (Γ, g1, h) and secret key p. For every
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, pick vi ← ZN and compute γi = gfi1 hvi . Output sk = (p, q, s, t) and
pk = (Γ, g1, h, g
s
1, g
s2
1 , . . . , g
s2
k−1
1 , γ), where γ = (γ0, . . . , γn).
• ProbGen(sk, α): For every ℓ ∈ [k], pick rℓ ← ZN and compute σℓ = gα2
ℓ−1
1 h
rℓ . Output
σ = (σ1, . . . , σk) and τ =⊥ (τ is not used).
• Compute(pk, σ): Compute ρi = gµik for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} using the technique in Sec-
tion 2.2. Compute ρ′i = e(γi, ρi) = g
µ′i
k+1, where µ
′
i = (fi + qδvi)µi. Compute ρ =
∏n
i=0 ρ
′
i.
Compute πij = g
νij
2k using the technique in Section 2.2 for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i}. Compute π′ij = e(γi+1, πij) = g
ν′ij
2k+1, where ν
′
ij = (fi+1 + qδvi+1)νij. Set
π =
∏n−1
i=0
∏i
j=0 π
′
ij.Output ρ and π.
• Verify(sk, τ, ρ, π): Compute the y ∈ Zq such that ρp = (gpk+1)y. If the equality e
(
t/gy1 , g
p
2k+1
)
=
e
(
gs1/g
α
1 , π
p
)
holds, output y; otherwise, output ⊥.
Figure 4: Univariate polynomial evaluation (Π′pe)
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• KeyGen(1λ,M): Pick Γ = (N,G1, G2, G3, e, g1, g2, g3) ← G(1λ, 3). Consider the PRFdlin in
Section 2.3. Run KG(1λ, n) and pick a secret key K. Pick a ← ZN and compute Tij =
g
p2aMij
1 · FK(i, j) for every (i, j) ∈ [n]2. Pick u← G1 and compute h = uq, where u = gδ1 for an
integer δ ∈ ZN . Set up BGN3 with public key (Γ, g1, h) and secret key p. For every (i, j) ∈ [n]2,
pick vij ← ZN and compute γij = gMij1 hvij . Output sk = (p, q,K, a, η) and pk = (Γ, g1, h, γ, T ),
where η = gp
2a
3 and γ = (γij).
• ProbGen(sk, x): For every j ∈ [n], pick rj ← ZN and compute σj = gxj1 hrj . For every i ∈ [n],
compute τi = e(
∏n
j=1 FK(i, j)
xj , gp2) using the efficient CFE algorithm in Section 2.3. Output
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) and τ = (τ1, . . . , τn).
• Compute(pk, σ): Compute ρi =
∏n
j=1 e(γij , σj) and πi =
∏n
j=1 e(Tij , σj) for every i ∈ [n].
Output ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn) and π = (π1, . . . , πn).
• Verify(sk, τ, ρ, π): For every i ∈ [n], compute yi such that ρpi = (gp2)yi . If e(πi, gp1) = ηpyi · τi for
every i ∈ [n], then output y = (y1, . . . , yn); otherwise, output ⊥.
Figure 5: Matrix multiplication (Π′mm)
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